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HOW TO CREATE A PHYSICAL
UNIVERSE EX NIHILO
Richard C. Potter

This paper examines the principle of creation ex nihilo as formulated by St. Augustine
and contrasts it with the common-sense principle that "something cannot come from
nothing." It is argued that these two principles, if suitably interpreted, are logically
consistent and a creation scenario is described in which their compatibility is demonstrated.

In Book XI of the Confessions, St. Augustine is concerned with the question:
"What was God doing before He made heaven and earth?"
St. Augustine's famous' response is to reject the question on the ground that
it is complex-for the question presupposes that there was time before the creation
of heaven and earth. St. Augustine argues that this presupposition is false by
appealing to the principle-which later came to be known as the Principle of
Sufficient Reason-that God never does anything without good reason. As he
sees it, the Principle of Sufficient Reason entails that there could have been no
time before the creation of the physical universe, for had there been, God would
have had no good reason for selecting one moment of time rather than some
other as the time at which to bring heaven and earth into being. I
1. The Conflict between the Augustinian Account and Common-Sense

Yet responding to the question in this way is not without its own peculiar
difficulty. For given that there was no time prior to God's act of creation, it
follows that no objects-not even God Himself--existed prior to God's initial
creative action. And from this it follows that there were no pre-existing objects
from which God could have fashioned the material universe at the time He
brought it into being.
Thus, St. Augustine's response commits him to the view that God created the
world of souls and bodies ex nihil~ut of nothing.
We may express St. Augustine's theory of the creation of the material world
in terms of the following proposition, which I shall call the Ex Nihilo Principle
(ENP). It may be stated as follows:
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(ENP) God created contingent objects in such a way that there was a
time T 1 at which contingent objects came into being, although there
was no time prior to T 1.
Now the problem with the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is notorious. For it is
apparently inconsistent with one of our most basic, common-sense beliefs:
namely, that something cannot come from nothing. Let us try to fommlate this
latter thesis more precisely, in order to determine whether it is in fact inconsistent
with the Augustinian theory of creation.
As I interpret it, the claim that something cannot come from nothing amounts
to the view that whatever comes into being at a certain time must be composed
out of things which existed prior to that time.
But what is it for one thing to be composed out of other things? If we allow
ourselves the concept of one thing's being a proper part of another as undefined,
we may say, first of all, that two objects are discrete if and only if (a) they are
not identical; (b) neither is a proper part of the other; and (c) they share no
proper part in common.
Any two things which are spatially separated are discrete. And any two things
which are in contact but which could-without gaining or losing any proper
part-become spatially separated are also discrete.
In terms of the concept of discreteness, we may now say that an object 0 is
composed out of certain other things Xl ... Xnjust in case (a) Xl ... Xn are discrete
from each other; (b) X I ... Xn are all proper parts of 0; and (c) no proper part
of 0 is discrete from every one of Xl.. .Xn.
In other words, object 0 is composed out of the objects Xl ... Xn just in case
o could be "sliced up," so to speak, into n pieces in such a way that the pieces
into which it was sliced were Xl.. .Xn.
We shall say that a composite (or a whole-I shall use these two terms interchangeably) is simply an object which is composed out of other objects, in the
sense just defined.
Thus, consider an ordinary composite, such as my desktop, D. Given our
definition, we may say, for example, that D is composed out of its left and right
halves. We may also say that D is composed out of its top and bottom halves.
Furthermore, we may say that D is composed out of its top and bottom left
quarters together with its top and bottom right quarters. For in each case, we
have a group of mutually discrete objects, each one of which is a proper part of
D, and which are such that no proper part ofD is discrete from every one of them.
In short, any conceivable way of "slicing up" D-whether into two, ten, or
a thousand pieces-is going to constitute a group of objects out of which D is
composed.
Given, then, the concept of one thing's being composed out of others, we
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may now formulate the thesis that something cannot come from nothing in terms
of the following proposition, which I shall call the Principle of Creation by
Compounding (PCC):
(PCC) For any object 0 and any time T, if 0 comes into being at time
T, then there exist some objects out of which 0 is composed and those
objects existed prior to time T.
Thus, according to the Principle of Creation by Compounding, any object 0
which comes into being is a composite; and there must be some conceivable
way of "slicing up" 0 into a group of objects which has these two properties:
(a) 0 is composed out of the objects in that group and (b) each of the objects
in that group existed before 0 came into being.
Although it may seem as though the tmth of this principle is obvious, we will
do well to consider the following possible objection:
"It would seem as though the Principle of Creation by Compounding is false
since it implies something which is simply untme: namely, that whatever comes
into being gets formed out of a plurality of things. But isn't it possible for one
thing X to come into being out of just one thing Y? Suppose, for instance, that
I take your desktop D and cut it into six pieces and then from those pieces I
constmct a box, B. Here, B hasn't come into being out of a plurality of things-it
has come into being out of just one thing; namely, D."
Now it is tme, in a sense, that B comes into being out of "just one thing." It
is tme in the sense that everything needed to compose B is already contained in
one single thing: namely, D. But it is not tme in the sense that B is composed
out of one single thing. For as the objector points out, he imagines cutting D
into six pieces which are subsequently joined in order to form B. B is thus
composed out of those six objects, each of which existed before B came into
being (for each of them, at one time, was a proper part of D). Hence, a situation
in which we take a single object, break it down, and from the remains construct
a new object is consistent with the Principle of Creation by Compounding.
But is St. Augustine's commitment to the Ex Nihilo Principle consistent with
the Principle of Creation by Compounding? When we combine these two propositions, the result does seem to be a logically inconsistent set of propositions:
(ENP) God created contingent objects in such a way that there was a
time T1 at which contingent objects came into being, although there
was no time prior to TI.
(PCC) For any object 0 and any time T, if 0 comes into being at time
T, then there exist some objects out of which 0 is composed and those
objects existed prior to time T.
It would seem as though these two theses are logically incompatible. For according
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to the Ex Nihilo Principle, there are certain contingent objects which God creates
at a particular time Tl; thus, there are certain contingent objects which come
into being at time Tl and therefore exist at time Tl. Yet there was no time prior
to Tl. Hence, those objects which God brings into being at that time have
evidently not been fashioned out of any pre-existing materials. Yet if this is
so-that is, if the objects which God creates at time Tl are not composed out
of things which existed prior to that time-then the Principle of Creation by
Compounding turns out to be false.
II. Approaches to the Problem

St. Augustine evidently took these two principles to be logically incompatible.
And so, anxious to salvage his theory of the creation of the physical universe,
he felt obliged to give up the Principle of Creation by Compounding. Yet it can
hardly be over-stated that by rejecting this principle, he did considerable violence
to our common-sense intuitions. For any case of a thing's coming into being
with which we are familiar is always a case in which one thing comes to exist
out of materials which already existed. A house is created by constructing it out
of pre-existing wood, brick, nails, and the like; a sculpture is created by bringing
together previously existing pieces of stone, metal, or clay; and even the first
stage of the body of a human being is created by the uniting of a sperm with an
egg, each of which existed prior to their interaction.
We have no concrete experience of anything coming into being without coming
into being through the compounding of individuals which already were in being.
Thus, nothing in our experience provides a counter-example to the Principle of
Creation by Compounding. Indeed, none of our experience provides us with the
slightest insight into how it would even be possible for there to be a thing which
comes into being in such a way that it, together with every one of its proper
parts, come into being simultaneously. Obviously, when we ask how God is
able to accomplish such a feat, it is hardly illuminating to be informed that "He
works in mysterious ways."
Of course, there is another way to respond to the problem-this would be to
simply deny St. Augustine's theory of the creation. Indeed, it may seem that
the intuitions in favor of the Principle of Creation by Compounding far outweigh
those in favor of the Ex Nihilo Principle; thus, one might argue that St. Augustine's
commitment to this latter thesis is simply untenable. Obviously, this proposal
would be totally unacceptable to St. Augustine: for opting in favor of this way
out forces us either to deny that God is the creator of heaven and earth or else
to face, once again, the question with which St. Augustine began: What was
God doing before He created those contingent beings which He did create? And
why did He pick one moment, ratherthan some other, to be the time of creation?
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But is there, from a logical point of view, any other way to deal with the
problem? Is the rejection of the Ex Nihilo Principle the only plausible response
to the charge of inconsistency?
III. A Different Approach
I believe that there is another way out of the difficulty. According to this
alternative solution, the alleged inconsistency is apparent only, and not genuine.
In other words, there is a way to interpret the two propositions cited so that it
is logically possible for them to both be true.
To begin with, let us note that the Ex Nihilo Principle is ambiguous. For,
depending upon what is understood by the expression: 'a time,' there are two
different ways in which to interpret the principle. Compare the following two
formulations:
(ENPl) God created contingent objects in such a way that there was an
instant T1 at which contingent objects came into being, although there
was no instant prior to T1 .
(ENP2) God created contingent objects in such a way that there was a
finite interval Tl during which contingent objects came into being,
although there was no interval prior to T1 and no instant during T I at
which contingent objects failed to exist.
Now the first version of the Ex Nihilo Principle is logically inconsistent with
the Principle of Creation by Compounding. For if this version of the Ex Nihilo
Principle is true, it follows that there was a first instant of time, and that at this
first instant there existed contingent beings. But in this event, it cannot be the
case that the Principle of Creation by Compounding is also true. For if there is
a first instant at which contingent beings exist, then those objects are created
without being composed out of pre-existing individuals.
On the other hand, the second version of the Ex Nihilo Principle is not logically
inconsistent with the Principle of Creation by Compounding-not unless, that
is, one assumes in addition that every interval of time must begin with some
particular instant. Yet it is precisely this further assumption that we must deny
if we are to make St. Augustine's theory of creation consistent with our commitment to the Principle of Creation by Compounding. Now to deny that every
interval must contain a first instant is to allow that there may have been at least
one interval of time which was, so to speak, "open-ended at its beginning."
What is an interval? If we allow ourselves the concept of an instant as undefined,
then we may understand an interval of time to simply be a set S containing at
least two instants which has these further properties: (a) every member of S is
an instant; (b) any two members of S are such that there is some third member
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of S which comes before one of them and after the other; and (c) any instaat
which comes before one member of S and after some other member of S is itself
a member of S.
Thus an interval, so understood, is simply a densely ordered, compact set of
instants. An interval which is open-ended at its beginning will be an interval
which has this further property: for any member of the interval, there is some
other member of the interval which comes before it.
Finally, one interval S may be said to wholly precede another interval R just
in case every member of S comes before every member of R.
Let us suppose, then, that time did have a beginning, as St. Augustine believed,
in the following sense: there was a finite interval of time which was such that
no interval of time wholly preceded it. But we shall not assume that time had
a beginning in the sense that there was a first instant of time. Thus, in the
situation envisaged, time has this property: although there is a finite interval of
time which fails to be wholly preceded by any interval of time, this interval is
open-ended at its beginning-it has no member which comes before every other
member.
Now can God create the physical universe, if time has this sort of beginning,
without violating the Principle of Creation by Compounding? Indeed He can:
for at any instant in the interval, there will already exist contingent beings which
God can subsequently use in order to compose some further contingent being.
Every contingent being will be created out of other individuals which already
existed in the interval. In other words, take any particular contingent object X
which God creates at some instant in this interval: if one were to ask, "Out of
what materials does God create X at that particular instant?" the answer will
always be the same: "God created X out of the individuals Yl ... Yn, each of
which already existed in the interval." And if we are asked, "But then, assuming
that Yl ... Yn are themselves created beings, out of what materials did God create
Yl...Yn at the instant(s) at which He brought them into being?" the answer will
be exactly the same: "God created each of them, at the instant He brought each
into being, out of individuals which already existed in the interval."
Since time, we are supposing, begins with an interval which itself is open-ended
at its beginning, it follows that there will have been no instant of time at which
contingent beings failed to exist; and yet God will have created contingent beings
in such a way that there was a time (i.e., an interval open-ended at its beginning)
which was not preceded by any interval of time. Thus the Ex Nihilo Principle-in
its second formulation-is salvaged.
This model of creation ex nihilo is, I submit, entirely consistent with the
Principle of Creation by Compounding. Since time begins with an interval which
is itself open-ended at its beginning, there will be no such thing as "the first
group of objects" created by God in the creation scenario described. Nevertheless,
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everything which comes into being is, at the time it comes into being, composed
out of objects which existed prior to that time. Thus, the Principle of Creation
by Compounding is not violated.
In this way, therefore, we can provide an account of God's creation of the
physical universe ex nihilo, without violating our most fundamental (and, I
believe, sound) intuition concerning how things come into being.
IV. Some Final Objections Considered

Let us conclude our discussion of St. Augustine's theory of creation ex nihilo
by considering two potential objections to the account I've sketched.
Objection 1. "According to your view, God creates contingent objects in such
a way that no contingent object (or group of such objects) gets created prior to
all others. Yet from this it follows that in order for God to create any particular
contingent object X, He must first create some other contingent being Y. Yet
before He can create Y, God must first create some other contingent being Z,
and likewise for Z, and so on ad infinitum. In other words, before God can
create any particular individual, He must first create something else. But how,
then, can God ever get started in creating anything at all? Surely, if God is ever,
at any time, already in the process of creating, He must have started creating at
some time. Thus, there is something wrong with your view."
This objection is reminiscent of one of Zeno's famous paradoxes of motion.
For consider Achilles, who is supposedly running a race, whose starting point,
let's assume, is PI. As Zeno notes, in order for it to be true that Achilles is
running the course, Achilles must move to some point, say, Pn, which is beyond
the starting point PI. Yet before Achilles can move to point Pn, he must first
move to some point between PI and Pn. Likewise, before he can ever reach that
point, he must first move to some point between it and PI; and so on ad infinitum.
Thus, before Achilles can ever reach any particular point on the course, he must
first reach some other point between it and the starting point. And so, Zeno
argues, Achilles can never be running, because to be in the process of running
requires that one start running-and yet Achilles can never get started. 2
Now it is obvious that people do run. And so Zeno's argument must be unsound
in some way. Where is the flaw in his reasoning? It would seem to reside in his
two assumptions: (a) in order to be in the process of running, one must have
started running and (b) starting to run requires that there be some first point
that one reaches beyond one's point of departure.
Therefore, we may respond to Zeno's paradox by denying one or the other
of these assumptions. If one insists that starting to run requires that there be
some first point that one reaches beyond one's point of departure, then we shall
simply say that one can be in the process of running without ever having started-
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in that sense-to run. On the other hand, if one demands that being in the process
of running requires one to have started running, then we shall simply deny that
starting to run implies that there be some first point that one reaches beyond
one's point of departure. In this case, we shall say that one has started to run
just in case one's running occurs throughout an interval which is not immediately
preceded by an interval during which one is running. 3
Now if this sort of response to Zeno's paradox is appropriate (and I believe
that it is), then we may reply to the original objection in a perfectly analogous way.
If the objector insists that God's starting to create requires that there be some
contingent beings which He creates prior to all others, then we shall simply deny
that in order for God to be in the process of creating, He must have started-in
that sense-to create. On the other hand, if the objector demands that God's
being in the process of creating requires that He have started creating, then we
shall simply deny that starting to create requires that there be some contingent
beings created prior to all others. In this case, God may be said to have started
creating in exactly the way I have suggested: for His being in the process of
creating occurs throughout an interval which is not immediately preceded by an
interval during which He is creating.
Objection 2. "Let us grant that there need be no particular group of contingent
beings which God creates prior to all others. Still, in your creation scenario,
you overlook the fact that there is one contingent object created by God whose
existence is not preceded by the existence of any other thing: this is the physical
universe itself. For as soon as God starts creating contingent beings, the physical
universe itself comes into being. Now since the Ex Nihilo Principle implies that
there is no time prior to the existence of contingent beings, it follows that nothing
exists prior to the existence of the physical universe. But if that is so, then it
would seem that when the physical universe comes into being, it is not composed
out of pre-existing materials. However, this contradicts the Principle of Creation
by Compounding; hence, your creation scenario is not really a logical possibility
after all."
This objection presupposes the following two things:
(Ai) If God created contingent objects, then He also created the physical
universe.
(A2) If God created the physical universe, then He created a contingent
object whose existence was not preceded by the existence of any contingent being.
However, whether each of these assumptions is true depends upon the way in
which we interpret the sentence 'God created the physical universe. ' On what I
shall call the non-substantial interpretation, this sentence is equivalent to the
statement 'God is ultimately causally responsible for the existence of contingent
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beings.' If we take 'God created the physical universe' in this way, then (A I)
turns out to be true; for (Al) then amounts to the statement 'If God created
contingent objects, then He is ultimately causally responsible for the existence
of contingent beings.'
On the other hand, if we take 'God created the physical universe' in its
non-substantial sense, then (A2) is not obviously true; for (A2) then amounts to
the statement 'If God is ultimately causally responsible for the existence of
contingent beings, then He created a contingent object whose existence was not
preceded by the existence of any contingent being.' As I have endeavored to
explain, it does seem to be logically possible for God to cause contingent objects
to come into being without being required to create any particular such object
prior to all others.
Meanwhile, it is also possible to provide what may be called the substantial
interpretation of the sentence 'God created the physical universe.' Taken in this
latter way, the sentence is equivalent to the statement 'God created a contingent
object that is "the totality" of all the contingent objects which ever exist.' If we
take 'God created the physical universe' in this latter way, then (A2) will tum
out to be true; for it will amount to the statement 'If God created a contingent
object that is "the totality" of all the contingent objects which ever exist, then
He created a contingent object whose existence was not preceded by the existence
of any contingent being.'
However, if we take 'God created the physical universe' in its substantial
sense in (AI), the result is not obviously true. For on that interpretation, (AI)
amounts to the statement 'If God created contingent objects, then He also created
a contingent object that is "the totality" of all the contingent objects which ever
exist. '
It is clear that in order for the objection to work, we must be willing to grant
that (AI) and (A2) are both true when 'God created the physical universe' is
interpreted substantially in both. For if (AI) and (A2) so interpreted are both
true, then they, in conjunction with the assumption that God created contingent
objects, will entail that God created a contingent object whose existence was
not preceded by the existence of any contingent being. The objector is quite
correct to point out that this consequence will wreak havoc with our creation
model. Indeed, it will require that we give up either the Ex Nihilo Principle or
else the Principle of Creation by Compounding.
But why should we grant that (A 1) and (A2) when thus interpreted are both
true? In particular, why should we assume that (A1)-when it is taken as equivalent to the statement 'If God created contingent objects, then He also created
a contingent object that is "the totality" of all the contingent objects which ever
exist'-is true?
Perhaps it will be argued that whenever several discrete objects co-exist, there
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is something which is the "sum" of those objects. In that case, once God creates
a certain group of discrete objects at a particular instant, this will entail that their
"sum" comes into being at the very same time. However, even if we grant the
highly dubious metaphysical principle invoked here, it won't follow that there
is any "sum" of contingent objects which qualifies as "the contingent object that
is the totality of all the contingent objects which ever exist." After all, the
objector grants the point that there is no particular group of contingent beings
which God creates prior to all others in our model. But if there is no such "first
group," then there is no "first sum" of contingent beings. And if there is no
"first sum" of contingent beings, then every "sum" will be such that its existence
is preceded by the existence of some other contingent object-namely, some
previously existing "sum" of contingent beings. No such "sum" will ever have
been such that it was "the totality" of all the contingent objects which did, do,
and will ever exist.
Or perhaps it will be argued that whenever things exist in succession, there
is something which is the "succession" of those objects. In that case, since
different contingent objects do exist in succession from the very beginning of
time, this will entail that their "succession" has existed for just as long as they
have. Nevertheless, it still won't follow that this "succession" of contingent
beings qualifies as "the contingent object that is the totality of all the contingent
objects which ever exist" unless we make the additional assumption that this
"succession" of contingent beings is itself a contingent being. However, as far
as I can see, to say that there is a "succession" of things in which, for example,
X is followed by Y and Y is followed by Z, is to say nothing more than that it
is true that X is followed by Y and that Y is in turn followed by Z. In other
words, it seems to me that talk about the "succession" of certain objects is most
plausibly construed as talk about the proposition which gives a true description
of the way in which those things succeed one another. And propositions, we
may suppose, are necessary beings contemplated by God.'
Therefore, I see no reason to suppose that God created contingent objects only
if He also created something which is their "totality. "5
In conclusion, it's worth noting that the question 'How did God create the
physical universe ex nihilo?' is itself potentially ambiguous. On the one hand,
it could mean the same as 'How could God have been ultimately causally responsible for the creation ex nihilo of contingent objects?' If we take the question in
this way, then the answer, I think, is to invoke the creation scenario described
earlier.
But on the other hand, the question could be taken to mean the same as 'How
could God have created ex nihilo a contingent object that is "the totality" of all
the contingent objects which ever exist?' If we take the question in this way,
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then the proper response, I believe, is to reject it-for its presupposes that there
is such a contingent being, and this is by no means obvious. 6
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